Operations NOBLE EAGLE, ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM it became clear that reliance on reserve forces in the operational environment would continue as far as could be envisioned. The Reserve Component had fundamentally changed, and approaches to managing reserve forces would also have to be changed to meet the new demands. 2 The new reality of the "long war" requires an optimized force management process to better serve our airmen.
In an effort to achieve optimization, Air Force Reserve Command (AFRC) has chosen to modernize its processes through a program called "AFR 2012". This program, involved the three major staffs of Headquarters AFRC (HQ/AFRC), the Office of the Air Force Reserve (AF/RE) and Air Reserve Personnel Center (ARPC) working together to establish a unity of effort across the command to manage, mobilize and generate its forces. 3 Lt Gen Stenner, Commander AFRC, stated, "We are revising our management structures and practices to make it easier for our Reservists to volunteer, mobilize, and deploy." 4 This modernization is critical to the Total Force because, "as our Air Force prepares for the future, streamlining how we bring highly capable and cost-effective Reservists on active duty is vital to our nation's defense." 5 Today's Air Force will be facing tighter budgets during the sustained operations of the long war, and must find efficiencies within the current system to preserve the unique capabilities of available to the nation in AFRC, but senior leaders must preserve the balance of a strategic reserve and operational capability while employing this force. Current processes for managing Reserve force mobilization and generation are tied to Cold War era policies that will not preserve or sustain both strategic and operational capability into the 21 st Century. 6 AFRC is taking steps to improve its business practices and force management processes to extract the maximum sustainable operational force capability, without "breaking" the strategic reserve. 7 One way to support this effort is for the Air Force to rethink the Gaining MAJCOM (G-MAJCOM) construct. The G-MAJCOM construct predates 1960 and was implemented by Air Force policy, not by statute; "The MAJCOM gaining a [RC] unit was responsible for training that unit during peacetime and absorbing that unit during wartime." 8 Today's modern readiness construct has changed in a way that requires AFRC to perform many of the roles once performed by the G-MAJCOMs.
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The Air Force must also modernize the mobilization process by synchronizing Global Force Management and Air Expeditionary Force policy to comply with the tenets of mobilization.
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The four tenets of successful mobilization doctrine are; "objective, unity of effort, flexibility, and timeliness." 11 Current AF practices are plagued by the competing interests of G-MAJCOMs and redundancies that violate doctrine, and reduce efficiency within the system. AFRC's proposal to improve mobilization will allow the command to work in its established MAJCOM role in parallel with other MAJCOMs to present and provide forces to the combatant commander while coordinating with the Component MAJCOMs. Maintaining a strategic reserve while simultaneously providing operational capability requires a new force management structure that has the tools and understanding to achieve sustainable balance through 100% visibility of AFRC forces. 12 The AF can achieve this visibility by embracing a single point of entry and exit for all Air Force Reserve personnel. AFRC's Force
Generation Center (FGC) will support this unity of effort and provide for the centralized management, mobilization and presentation of AFR forces to the combatant commander, MAJCOMs, agencies, and other staffs. 13 The FGC, upon reaching full operational capability, will provide AFRC total visibility of its forces and the ability to efficiently provide those forces to its customers for both strategic surge and sustainable operational capability.
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Strategic and Operational Reserve Capability
Jacob Klerman in a RAND study noted, the United States is engaged in a war characterized by long term conflict in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other parts of the world, during which the Department of Defense (DoD) has made unprecedented use of its Reserve Component.
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Reserve forces previously viewed as strategic in nature were called upon less than once in a generation. These forces are now used as a regular operational force, often referred to as the "operational reserve," with an expectation of reserve call-up as much as one in six years, and recently even more frequently. With an explicit recognition of the evolution from providing a purely strategic role (aka, mobilize-train-deploy), to a reserve force that provides sustainable operational capability, there must be a balance in how that force is managed and utilized. In a letter to Secretary Gates, the CNGR wrote, the new "operational reserve must be available for emergencies at home and abroad, and must fully integrate with the active component. Simultaneously, this force must retain its strategic elements and capabilities." 31 The CNGR concluded that the future of the allvolunteer force depends on "policymakers undertaking needed reforms to ensure the Reserve The challenge for strategic leaders is recognizing the max sustainable balance or "break point," in reserve force utilization. 
The Gaining MAJCOM
One way the Air Force can achieve strategic and operational balance is to rethink the Gaining reform. 37 The current G-MAJCOM concept has "not kept pace with how forces are presented and provided under more advanced constructs prescribed by law and policy, such as Goldwater- to support a reservist throughout the mobilization process and ensure the member is tracked from pre-deployment through mobilization and demobilization; ensuring each member's needs are accounted for. 75 If one compares the process to better business practices, the capability for AFRC to have complete visibility and oversight of its forces throughout the process is simply good supply chain management, and affords the command the best ability to take care of its most valuable asset, the citizen airmen.
76
The FGCs transactional operations management and greater force visibility will enable the command to better perform its L-MAJCOM role. By having a single point of entry and exit for all AFR forces, AFRC will be able to work in conjunction with the other MAJCOMs to coordinate mobilization sourcing solutions. In an interview the FGC Commander, Brig Gen
William Binger gave an example of a command request for 100 Security Forces (SF) personnel.
If, say for example, AMC has visibility of only 30 SF personnel available in their MAJCOM, they may require partial mobilization, but the FGC will have visibility of all reserve SF personnel across all the MAJCOMs and may be able to provide the 100 SF personnel for the task on an all-volunteer basis, rather than through mobilization. 77 Greater visibility is good supply chain management, which enables the AFR to care for its airmen and its customers with more efficiency, simultaneously serving the needs of the commander.
The Counter Argument
Not everyone, however, agrees that the empowerment of AFRC and the adoption of the personnel policies described previously are required. This analysis researched "staff comments" from action officers across different commands to include AMC, ACC, and the ANG. The following discussion will provide insight into some of the different concerns related to AFRC's process solutions, as well as provide critical analysis of the counter arguments.
First, there is some concern that AFRC would be interfacing directly with the combatant commands with regard to sourcing solutions for AFR personnel. 78 The reality is that AFRC Action officers also did not want to see AFR policy efforts create two different mobilization processes, one for the Guard and one for the Reserves. 80 While these concerns are valid, the ANG has acknowledged great benefit in these initiatives. 81 In addition, the FGC will have organizational parity with the National Guard Bureau's Readiness Center. 82 The only major difference regarding AFRCs proposed mobilization process is that AFRC (exercising its L-MAJCOM authority) would coordinate sourcing solutions through the C-MAJCOMs to the to the popular belief that G-MAJCOMs will be "relinquishing control" of AFR forces, the reality is that under any status less than full mobilization, AFRC retains ADCON of its forces unless it transfers or provides the using command varying levels of specified ADCON, depending on the mobilization scenario.
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Recognizing these action officer concerns, AFRC has worked with each command to allow these initiatives to move forward for process improvement. Most of the remaining resistance to change seems to be due to organizational or cross-cultural barriers, either amongst the Active 
Recommendations
Secretary of the Air Force, Michael B. Donley, in a speech to senior leaders of the ANG, on 16 November 2010, stated, "As we continue to depend on the Guard and Reserve in the future, and the distance between the concepts of a strategic reserve and an operational reserve continues to shrink, we must strive for even more commonality in the way we operate. The same commonality will also help us to establish a more seamless Continuum of Service. 100 Ultimately, our leaders must implement change that will benefit both the Total Force and the Reserve citizen airmen.
To protect our airmen's future and ensure our continued success as a global power, the Air Force must allow AFRC to balance the strategic reserve and operational force capability it provides to prevent a "break point." 101 Implementation of PAD efforts to reform the Gaining MAJCOM construct will allow the command to better perform its Lead MAJCOM role to achieve capability balance. The Air Force must also modernize the mobilization process to capitalize on GFM and AEF policy. The Reserve Component can leverage its experience and the visibility of its forces to work in parallel with the other MAJCOMs for requirement solutions. 
